100 Days of Trump II: What are the key national security challenges posed by the US administration, beyond the 51st state?

Before diving into some of the national security priorities for the new Carney Government, I first wanted to address some of the challenges the country is facing as a result of Trump administration polices and preferences. This view will shape some of the recommendations I will make in my next post.

I start with two assumptions:

1) That working level communication between Canadian and American officials is likely somewhat diminished but ongoing. The United States and Canada share a large border and continent which requires constant communication, contact and shared management.

2) The idea of the United States militarily invading Canada still remains in the realm of science fiction. I am not worried about Canada becoming the 51^st state, but there are a number of challenges posed by developments in the United States that will likely impact the national security of Canada in the coming months and years that will require us to act and make changes to the structure and operations of our national security institutions.

Finally, I am not saying that all the below scenarios are happening in whole or in part, but they are possibilities. It is clear that other US allies and partners are thinking through the implications of a radically realigning United States and it is important for us to do the same.

Reduced Intelligence Sharing

It is my view that Canada is not at risk of being kicked out of the Five Eyes (as had been suggested by some US officials in February). The Five Eyes is not some kind of birthday party where members are invited and dismissed on the basis of schoolground politics – it is an information sharing infrastructure where members have developed specialized capabilities over time in ways that benefit each other. While Canada is a net consumer of intelligence in this relationship, this does not mean it can be easily dismissed or its capabilities easily replicated. While allies often complain that they would like Canada to do more, it is not because we are bad at what we do – our friends want more from us because we are actually quite good at it.

Yet, the possibility of diminished intelligence sharing is real and not unprecedented. Following Canada’s decision not to participate in the 2003 Iraq War, Canada was briefly shut out of decision making and information sharing at NORAD. This was quickly changed due to the need to cooperate on continental defence and other security issues. However, former Canadian National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Vincent Rigby, has said that a reduction of intelligence sharing was “raised on one or two occasions” during the first Trump administration when tensions between the two countries was high.

Even in March, when while announcing the F-47 plane, Trump suggested that he is willing to sell them to allies, but “we like to tone them down about 10 percent which probably makes sense because someday, maybe they’re not our allies, right?” Although a plane is different from intelligence, it suggests that the US will scale back its security cooperation when it is perceived to be in the interest of the Trump administration.

But the clearest example that the present American administration is willing to slow or even halt the sharing of information as a way of punishing and pressuring its friends came earlier this year when the US cut off intelligence sharing with Ukraine as it fights for its survival against Russia as a way of punishing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Canada, in a far less precarious situation, might be subject to these kinds of fights in a battle over tariffs, trade agreements or the sharing of its natural resources.

The “Trumpification” of Intelligence

As an alternative to cutting off intelligence to Canada, the Trump administration may only share the kinds of information that conforms to its narrow world view. This could be the result of two developments. First, the Trump administration may consciously and deliberately select information to share with Canada to impact our preferences and decision making in ways that reflect its interests. Take as a hypothetical scenario, the Trump administration may choose to only share information that – for example – shows Ukraine is losing the war and unable to continue its fight against Russia, in order to convince Canada to pressure Ukraine into peace negotiations that favour Russian preferences.*

I think an alternate but more likely scenario under this category is that Trump administration officials may be directing intelligence collection in ways that fundamentally reflect rather than challenge Trump’s world view. Importantly, the US intelligence community is comprised of career diplomats who are also fierce bureaucratic fighters. These individuals are used to waging jurisdictional battles and fighting for the interests of their fiefdoms. However, a major difference between Trump I and Trump II is that any remaining adults in the room have been silenced. Instead, Trump has been able to fill his cabinet and key national security appointments with loyalists that are more willing to openly praise rather than challenge him. Therefore, while I suspect that the main intelligence agencies are still collecting vast amounts of intelligence (given that this is their raison d’être), their intelligence priorities may be shifting away from certain areas (such as Russia) and towards others (such as traditional friends and allies). We have already seen, for example, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth pause US cyber operations against Russia by US cyber command. (Although some point out that the 2025 World Wide Threat Assessment reflected a change in US priorities, but that there was no “fudging of the facts” as the underpinning analysis remains sound.)

Reduced Sharing Capacity

The US intelligence community and capability is vast and largely unmatched globally. That being said, it is clear that the Trump administration is making cuts that align with its ideological views and interests. This means that some of the institutions, agencies and departments (or bodies within them) that Canada has worked with in the past may no longer be around.

For example, the Trump administration has dismantled the apparatus around electoral integrity in the United States. If Canada and the US were sharing information about protecting elections, or helping to monitor for interference and disruptions, those institutions are no longer there to partner with. In addition, drastic cuts at the US State Department mean that there will be far fewer staff to interact and work together with on shared security issues.

While Canada can work with other allies, it is likely that US partnerships in these areas will be missed.

Fewer Shared Interests

By now it is clear that Canada and the Trump administration differ on many different national security issues, making it harder to have a shared national security vision that has facilitated past cooperation and intelligence sharing.

Perhaps the clearest example of this is ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE). The Trump administration sent a clear signal about its intentions when it pardoned all individuals convicted of offences for their participation in the January 6 attack on Congress. Since then its officials have downplayed far-right extremism as a threat, cancelled research on IMVE, and shuttered funding for research on disinformation. US officials allegedly pressured Romania to ease its restrictions against manosphere influencers Andrew and Tristan Tate and has appointed far-right influencers into key law enforcement agencies.

Moreover, despite its emphasis on countering fentanyl, especially at its borders, the United States is disbanding key units aimed at prosecuting certain kinds of organized crime and illegal activities, such as those around cryptocurrency scams and money laundering.

These moves make it clear that the Trump administration is aiming to create a law-enforcement apparatus that is more interested in ideological alignment with the president’s goals (at least at the senior levels) than following the rule of law.

The need for national security independence

The re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States demonstrates that “Trumpism” is likely to be a lasting presence in US politics for decades. When Trump eventually leaves office, his impact on US national security and law enforcement will have been profound.

Our geographic reality means that Canada will need to continue working with the United States. We cannot ignore a nation of 350 million individuals with whom we share an undefended border. There are two final implications as a result.

First, Canadian national security agencies will have to adjust to this new normal. Cooperation may be more strained and there may be pressure to go along with certain changes in US security priorities. We are already seeing this to a certain extent on the issue of fentanyl – an issue with which Canada surely shares an interest with the United States, but where one can question the heavily militarized approach favoured by the Americans in countering the problem.

Second, Canada must prioritize the assertion of its own sovereignty over its own national security. This means making long-needed changes in how key agencies function and rethinking what it is we want our departments and agencies to achieve and with what powers. Perhaps paradoxically, our sovereignty will also depend on our ability to make new alliances and partnerships with other like-minded countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

In my next post, I will offer four national security priorities for the Carney government and Parliament to consider.

*For what it is worth, I am relatively confident that Canada has its own robust collection on the Ukraine conflict. It just seemed like an easy scenario to use.